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SURVEY AND BACKGROUND OF STATE STATUTES CONCERNING
CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION
With the great influx of automobiles on the
nation's highways in recent years, effective
enforcement of traffic laws has become a
major problem in each state. In all states it is
a violation of the law to drive while "intoxi-
cated" or "while under the influence" of al-
cohol.' Before the advent of scientific tests to
determine intoxication, prosecutors had to
rely primarily on testimony as to the defend-
ant's breath, abnormal speech, flushed face,
co-ordination, and other such symptoms. By
these methods, however, it was difficult to
prove intoxication, since there is no single
symptom produced by alcohol which cannot be
caused by some other factor or condition.2
This difficulty has now been greatly alleviated
by the use of chemical tests for determining
alcoholic intoxication.
Medical and other scientific authorities are
in general agreement that the amount of al-
cohol present in a person's blood can be ac-
curately determined by chemical analysis of
that person's body specimen.3 The amount of
1 See e.g. N. Y. VEmcry. & TRArric LAw §70-5
(McKinney 1952) "intoxicated"; IuL. R.v. STAT.
953 §144 (1953), Omo RE V. CoDE §4511.19 (1953)
"under the influence".
2 Slot, The Medico-Legal Aspects of Drunkeness,
3 MED. L. & Cmi. R. 282 (1935); Selesnick,
Alcoholic Intoxication. Its Diagnosis and Medico-
Legal Implications, 110 J.A.M.A. 775 (1938).
3Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34
Ky. L. J. 250 (1946). Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-
Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine In-
toxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191 (1939); Newman
alcohol present in the blood indicates the degree
of intoxication.
State and local police forces in forty-five
states have employed these tests, recognizing
their value in law enforcement.4 However, the
use of these tests and their results have not
been without challenge, one of the chief objec-
tions raised in the series of cases on the subject
has involved the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.5 Only the self-incrimination privilege
contained in state constitutions and statutes
6
restrict state action, since the privilege guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution is not applicable to the state
governments. 7 Although the accused is pro-
tected against being compelled to incriminate
himself in all states, this privilege prevents only
the "employment of legal process to extract
from a person's lips an admission of guilt." s
Thus the privilege applies to testimonial ut-
terances and not to physical evidentiary facts
which may be obtained from the defendant even
by compulsion. 9 Although a few early cases0
and Fletcher, The Effec of Alcohol on Driving Skill,
115 J.A.M.A. 1600 (1940).
Report of the Committee on Tests for Intoxica-
tion, National Safety Council, 1953.
5 See DONIGAN, CHEmcAL TEsT CAsE LAW
(1950).
6 Iowa and New Jersey have statutory provisions.
7 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
8 8 WIomoRE, EVIDENCE, §2275 (3d ed. 1940).
9 I.BAu, SELF-INcunMNATION, (1950). UNmo m
Rurs or EVIDENCE, Rule 25 (c) provides, "no
person has the privilege to refuse to furnish or
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indicated that the issue of compulsion would
determine the admissibility of chemical tests,
the vast majority of the more recent decisions
adhere to the historical interpretation of the
privilege as embracing only compulsory testi-
monial utterances." The recent case of State
v. Berg12 exemplifies this interpretation. Police
officers held the defendant in a position which
allowed his breath to be captured for chemical
analysis. Although compulsion was used, the
court held that the privilege against self-
incrimination prohibits only testimonial com-
pulsion.
The admissibility of chemical tests into evi-
dence has also been challenged as constituting
unreasonable search and seizure. State action
in this area is not governed by the Federal
Constitutional provision, butrather bytheprovi-
sion in the particular state constitution. 3 The
protection granted was designed to prevent
searches of homes without warrants issued upon
reasonable grounds, and to protect against
searches of the person without legal justifica-
tion. The test is one of reasonableness. In all
jurisdictions, a search and seizure incidental to
an arrest is considered reasonable, hence other-
wise unobjectionable bodily specimens obtained
in that manner are admissible. A minority of
states follow the Federal rule as announced in
Weeks v. U.S.14 that otherwise competent
evidence must be excluded if such evidence is
unlawfully obtained. However, most state
courts hold that the illegality of a seizure does
not affect its admissibility.' 5 Nevertheless under
both views, if the subject is under arrest at the
time the specimen is obtained there can be no
permit the taking of samples of body fluids or
substances for analysis."
10 State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275
(1941) (dicta); Booker v. City of Cincinnati, 5
Ohio Op. 433 (1936) (dicta); Apodaca v. State, 140
Tex. Cr. R. 593, 146 S.W. 2d 381 (1940).
1 See note 5 supra.
"76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953).
13 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
14 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
s Ala., Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., Conn., Ga.,
Kan., La., Me., Mass., Minn., Neb., Nev., N. H.,
N. J., N. M., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Ohio, Ore., Pa.,
S. C., Texas, Utah, Vt., Va.
valid claim as to unreasonable search and
seizure.
Although state action is not in any way
limited by provisions in the Federal Constitu-
tion regarding "self-incrimination" or "search
and seizure", it is not totally exempt from
Federal control. Extreme action in obtaining
the specimen may violate the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Rochin v. California,16 physical evidence ob-
tained by "methods that offend a sense of
justice"'17 was held violative of due process.
After Rochin had been surprised by officers
entering his bedroom, he attempted to destroy
narcotic evidence by swallowing two capsules
containing morphine. The officers recovered the
two capsules by compelling Rochin to submit to
the ordeal of a stomach pump. Although the
shocking method which was employed may par-
tially account for the Supreme Court's deci-
sion, it is possible that a state conviction for
drunken driving would also be reversed if the
defendant resisted attempts to obtain a speci-
men, so that the officers had to use brutal force
or means highly uncomfortable or dangerous
to the defendant. 8 The facts of the Berg case-
the forcible capture of a breath specimen-
were distinguished by the Arizona Supreme
Court from the Rochin doctrine on the ground
that the methods used were neither brutal nor
highly dangerous.
Once the specimen is lawfully obtained and
analyzed, the admission of the results depends
on the satisfaction of certain rules of evidence.
Initially the test must be shown to be reliable."
The fact that there is lack of unanimity in the
medical profession as to whether intoxication
can be determined by the test merely affects
16 342 U.S. 168 (1952).
" Id. at 173.
18 People v. Walton docket no. 402, a case pres-
ently before the U. S. Supreme Court is somewhat
analogous. The defendant contends that a tech-
nician drew a blood sample over his objections.
However, the defendent did not offer physical
resistance.
19 People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 203, 38 N.W.2d
322 (1949) (evidence from breath test excluded
because there was no testimony as to the reliability
of the test).
[Vol. 46
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the weight of the evidence, but does not destroy
its admissibility.20 Furthermore, the specimen
must be shown to have been processed with
proper chemical instruments" and by qualified
personnel." The specimen in issue must also be
identified as the defendant's by a chain of proof
demonstrating that the specimen taken from the
defendant was the specimen analyzed.2 When
the specimen passes through a great number of
hands, it is not unreasonable for a jury to en-
tertain some doubts as to whether its integrity
as a sample had been preserved.24 When the re-
sults have been obtained by chemical analysis
a standard is required for correct evaluation by
the trier of fact since the test result is in terms
of the percent of alcohol to weight of blood.
Unless there is a statute setting the standards,
expert testimony must establish that fact in
each case in which scientific evidence of in-
toxication is used.
Survey of State Statutes
The standard generally accepted is identical
to that embodied in the 1952 Uniform Vehicle
Code' 5 which reads:
(a) It is unlawful and punishable as pro-
20People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99
N.E.2d 567 (1951); Mckay v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R.
370, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1951).
" In State v. Hunter, 4 N. J. Super. 531, 68 A.2d
274 (1949) (breath test evidence was excluded upon
a showing that an accurate chemical scale was not
used).
22Hill v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 313, 256 S.W.2d
93 (1953) (breath test evidence excluded upon a
showing that the police officer could not give the
mathematical result of the test from his own
calculations, and was allowed to run test without
expert supervision.)
"Evidence of urine test improperly admitted
without sufficient identification in Novak v.
District of Columbia, 160 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir.
1947); Evidence was admitted with sufficient
identification in Burleson v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R.
112, 261 S.W.2d 726 (1953); McAllister v. State,
159 Tex.Cr. R. 57, 261 S.W.2d 332 (1953).
2Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Wisc.
394, 404, 291 N.W. 384, 388 (1940).
"5 National Safety Council, UiaronR VEmcm
CoDE, Act V. §54 (1952).
vided in paragraph (d) of this section for any
person who is under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor to drive or be in actual
physical control of any vehicle within this
state.
(b) In any criminal prosecution for a
violation of paragraph (a) of this section
relating to driving a vehicle under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor, the amount
of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the
time alleged as shown by chemical analysis
of the defendant's blood, urine, breath, or
other bodily substance shall give rise to the
following presumptions:
1. If there was at the time 0.05 or less by
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood,
it shall be presumed that the defendant was
not under the influence of intoxicating
liquor;
2. If there was at the time in excess of 0.05
but less than 0.15 percent by weight of
alcohol in the defendant's blood, such fact
shall not give rise to any presumption that
the defendant was or was not under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact
may be considered with other competent
evidence in determining the guilt or innocence
of the defendant;
3. If there was at the time 0.15 or more by
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood,
it shall be presumed that the defendant was
under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
4. The foregoing provisions of paragraph
(b) shall not be construed as limiting the
introduction of any other competent evi-
dence bearing upon the question of whether
or not the defendant was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor28
It is evident that the primary purpose of this
proposed act is to establish standards and thus
eliminate the requirement of expert testimony.
The provisions of the Uniform Vehicle code are
embodied, without substantial addition or
deviation in the codes of Arizona, Idaho,
Indiana, New Hampshire, South Carolina,
2"The subsections dealing with narcotics and
penalties are excluded. No attempt will be made to
compare penalty provisions of this act and state
statutes, or among the various state statutes.
19551
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South Dakota, and Utah.2 The statutes of
Oregon,23 and Virginia0 make no mention of
standards at all. These standards, therefore
must be determined according to the rules of
evidence which require that a proper foundation
be laid by expert testimony. Maine's statuteO0
varies from the usual standard in that it raises
a presumption of sobriety when there is evi-
dence of /00 percent or less by weight of
alcohol in a person's blood. The range where
there is no presumption either for or against
intoxication is consequently narrowed between
Y- 00 to I O. On the other hand the Ten-
nessee statute' adopts the Code's presumption
for intoxication, but omits any standard to
create a presumption against intoxication or a
range where no presumption is created.32
The proposed Code does not purport to
answer various other procedural questions en-
countered in the use of chemical tests, some of
the more important of which are as follows:
How may the motorist's compliance with the
officer's request for a specimen be obtained?
Can the motorist refuse to submit to a test?
May such a refusal be offered into evidence?
Who should obtain the specimen? Which types
of tests are reliable? Can the motorist demand a
test as a matter of right? If he can, who should
pay for the costs incurred? The law enforce-
ment agencies of the states which adopt only
the provisions of the Code therefore must make
their own determination of these questions
without the aid of statutory guidance.
The statutes of Arizona, Indiana, Tennessee
27 Amiz. CoDE ANN. §66-156 (Supp. 1951);
IDAHO CODE §49-520.2 (1948); INn. STAT. ANN.
§47-2003 (1952); N.H. Session Laws c. 204 (1949);
S. C. CoDE §46-344 (1952); S. D. Session Laws c. 42
(1949); UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-44. (1953).
28 0R. REv. STAT. §483.630 (1953).
29 VA. CODE §18-75.1 (Supp. 1954).
30 ME. REv. STAT. c. 19 §121 (1944).
31 Tenn. Public Acts c. 202 (1953).
22 The practical consequences of this type of a
provision is to require the defendant to use expert
testimony in order to establish any presumption
against intoxication, while the prosecution can
dispense with expert testimony to establish a pre-
sumption for intoxication.
and Wisconsin13 do not indicate how a speci-
men is to be obtained, hence the issue of whether
reasonable force would be permissible is left
for judicial determination. The question of how
to obtain a specimen of the defendant's breath
is answered in Arizona by the Berg case, where
reasonable force without brutality was con-
doned. There are indications that this would
also be permitted in Indiana.N However, sta-
tutes in Georgia, Kentucky, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Virginia and Washing-
ton35 specifically require that the subject con-
sent to the test. But only the Kentucky statute
provides that the motorist's refusal to consent
can be admitted into evidence, 38 which may or
may not be an impelling reason for the motorist
to submit to a chemical test. The statutes of
Maine, Nebraska and Oregon,7 while not stat-
ing specifically that the motorist can refuse to
give specimen, state as much by implication
through provisions which prohibit the intro-
duction of the refusal into evidence." Corn-
3 Ariz. supra note 27; Ind. supra note 27; Tenn.
supra note 31; Wisc. STAT. §85.13 (1951).
SInd. Op. Atty. Gen. 1949, p. 210; "There is no
legal impediment which would prevent the use by
the State Police of any reasonable force or compul-
sion in making an accused person take such a test.
I think the use of force or compulsion to require the
taking of the drunkometer test, falls into the same
category as the slight and reasonable physical
force which is used sometimes in taking fingerprints
or in making physical examination of accused
persons."
22 GA. CODE ANN. §68-1625 (Supp. 1954); Ky.
REv. STAT. §189.520 (Supp. 1954); N. J. STAT.
ANN. §39: 4-50.1 (Supp. 1953); N. Y. Vxmciz &
TRAFFIc LAW §70-5, 71-a (McKinney 1952); N. D.
REv. CODE §39-0801 (Supp. 1953); Va. supra
note 29; WAsH. REv. CODE §46.56.010 (1951).
20 See note 35 supra. Section (6) of the Kentucky
statute provides, "No person may be compelled
to submit to any test specified in subsection (4)
of this section, but his refusal to submit to such
test may be commented upon by the prosecution
in the trial against any person charged with operating
any vehicle under the influence of alcohol."
37 Me. supra note 30; NEB. REv. STAT. §727.01
and 727.02; Ore. supra note 28.
381n the absence of such provisions comment
[Vol. 46
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ment on a motorist's refusal is also prohibited
in Georgia, Virginia and Washington. 9 Only
the New York statute provides sanctions
operating to gain consent, without resorting to
compulsion.
The New York statute40 rests upon a concept
enunciated in People v. Rosenlzeirner,4' that in
"operating a motor vehicle the operator exer-
cises a privilege which might be denied him, and
not a right, and in case of a privilege the
legislature may prescribe on what conditions
it shall be exercised." The legislature in New
York imposed such a condition on the privilege
of operating a motor vehicle in New York-
in other words, any person so doing is deemed to
have consented in advance to a chemical test.
The statute provides that if the motorist re-
fuses to take the test when requested to by an
arresting officer, the officer by making a sworn
statement to the Commissioner can cause the
motorist's license to be suspended. Revocation
of the license may occur after a hearing, or
when the motorist fails to make a timely de-
mand for a hearing during the suspension."
This type of aid to law enforcement agencies is
certainly desirable and therefore it would not
be unreasonable to predict that this statute will
be a model for future statutes in other states."
would be allowed, since the chemical tests are not a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
39 See note 35 supra.
40 See note 35 supra.
41209 N. Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).
-Id. at 121, 102 N.E. at 532.
43The original New York law provided for
automatic revocation of license when the motorist
refused to take the test. N. Y. Reg. Sess. c. 854
(1953). However, this was held invalid by the New
York court in Schutt v. Macduff, 205 Misc. 43,
127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1954). The present law cures
the objections raised to the original act by pro-
viding for a hearing before revocation.
44 Puerto Rico has adopted legislation patterned
after the New York law. Puerto Rico Laws, 1954,
No. 95, Puerto Rico Law of Automobile Transit
Act 13 §§3-7; In Feb. 1955 the Indiana House
adopted an amendment to provide for a suspension
of license for one year if the motorist refused to
take a drunkometer test after arrest.
The Uniform Vehicle Code does not attempt
to enumerate the tests which are reliable to
establish the amount of alcohol in a person's
blood. This also has been overlooked in all but
two state statutes on the subject. The North
Dakota statute,45 provides that the "Drunko-
meter" or other similar devices approved by the
American Medical Association and the Na-
tional Safety Council can be used for breath
analysis. The statute does not further specify
particular tests for other body specimens. In the
Nebraska statute8 it is provided that in order to
be considered valid, chemical tests will have to
be performed according to methods approved by
the Department of Health and by an individual
possessing a valid permit issued by the De-
partment for that purpose. The Department is
thereby authorized to set valid and reliable
methods of analyzing breath, blood, spinal
fluid, and urine.
The Nebraska law also provides a method of
determining who should perform these chemical
tests by requiring an operator to be certified by
the Department of Health. The New York law
does not state who should perform the analysis
of a body specimen, but declares that the ob-
taining of a blood specimen must be done by a
physician.47 But samples of breath, urine, or
saliva can be obtained by persons other than
physicians. The Georgia statute" is similar to
both in some respects. It provides that the
Director of Public Safety shall designate one
or more physicians for each county to perform
blood tests upon arrested subjects if and when
they demand a chemical test. However, if the
subject does not demand a test, but merely
consents to take one, he may be given any test
and a blood specimen need not be withdrawn by
a physician.
The Georgia law gives the subject a right to
demand a blood test, and it is mandatory upon
the arresting officer to provide it, if possible.
The Virginia 4 statute is somewhat similar to
45 See note 35 supra.
46 See note 36 .uina.
47 See note 35 supra.
48 See note 35 supra.
49 See note 29 supra.
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this provision except that the choice of tests is
not limited to the blood test, and the test is
not mandatory upon the arresting officer, al-
though it does impose a duty on him to render
full assistance to obtain such a determination.
There is a monetary consideration involved in
the Georgia law since an individual demanding
a blood test has to pay the expense of the test,
although the statute limits his liability to ten
dollars. In New York and presumably the
other states, the costs are borne by the local
governmental agencies.50
The statutes of New York and WisconsinR
require that chemical tests must be given within
two hours of arrest. The purpose of this provi-
sion is evidently to insure that the test will be
given soon enough after the violation so that
specimen samples will be obtained before the
alcohol in the body is dissipated. The provision
is well adapted to situations where the violation
and arrest occur in a short time interval. How-
ever in accident cases where a more serious
charge may be brought such as negligent homi-
cide, arrest may be delayed in order to evaluate
the feasibility of such a charge in view of the evi-
dence. In such an instance if the subject sub-
mits to a test after the accident but not within
two hours of any subsequent arrest, the test
results will not be admitted into evidence. The
Wisconsin case of State v. Resler,u is an illus-
tration. There the defendant caused his auto-
mobile to overturn, killing a passenger. About
one hour after this accident he voluntarily
submitted to a urinalysis. It was not until
fourteen hours later that he was arrested for
negligent homicide. His conviction was reversed
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court since the
procedure was contrary to the time provision
contained in the statute, It is submitted that
the statutes should recognize that chemical
tests are used primarily to determine the in-
dividual's condition at the time of the alleged
violation of the law, and the time of the arrest
10 See 9 Op. State Compt. File No. 6392 (1953)
and 9 Op. State Compt. File No. 6381 (1953) of
New York.51 N. Y. supra note 35, Wisc. supra note 33.
52262 Wisc. 285, 55 N.W.2d 35 (1952); [1953]
Wisc. L. RPv. 560.
should be immaterial when the subject con-
sents. The New York law has not yet been con-
fronted with any similar case.
The Oregon statuten has an innovation which
should be noted-it applies only to counties
with more than 200,000 population. This
statute does not prevent other counties from
using chemical tests,M but has the anomalous
effect of giving individuals in the more populous
counties a statutory right to refuse to take the
tests. Moreover, since the statute does not
apply to the less populous counties the ad-
ministration of chemical tests is governed by
common law principles which allow reasonable
force to procure a specimen.
CONCLUSION
The states have not only authority, but a
duty to protect the health, safety, and morals
of their citizens. It cannot be denied that deaths
and property damage caused by automobile
accidents are now at a peak. How much of this
misfortune is caused by alcohol cannot be
accurately determined. However, at least a
significant part of this problem can be avoided
by wider application of chemical tests for in-
toxication. There need be no fear that the guilt
or innocence of a defendant will be decided by
chemical analysis rather than by the trier of
fact. The presumptions created by chemical
tests are, in law, not conclusive but are rebut-
table; their accuracy is widely attested to by
the medical profession and other scientists.
The wise prosecutor would not attempt to
rely on the test result alone, but would supple-
ment his case with collateral evidence of intox-
ication. In this regard the Wisconsin statute 5
provides that the test alone will not sustain
a conviction. The other states adopt the view
of the Vehicle Code that the use of the test
does nor bar other competent evidence for or
against intoxication.
- See note 28 supra.
MOre. Op. Atty. Gen. p. 210 1942-44.
55 See note 33 supra. The presumption for in-
toxication "... shall not without corroborating
physical evidence thereof, be sufficient upon which
to find the defendant guilty of being under the
influence of intoxicants."
[Vol. 46
